At a glance
2025 put de-dollarisation on the table: political pressure on the Federal Reserve and a wave of dollar-underweight positioning made it a theme every global treasury had to grapple with.
But the evidence says the dollar is staying: BIS trade data and institutional research shows the dollar debasement story is premature.
If anything, the dollar remains foundational: better access and execution of USD channels are a priority for ex-U.S. treasury.
The dollar won't be replaced by gold or stablecoins and will remain the backbone of global trade and financing. That means the global treasurer will require optimal dollar clearing and management solutions at their disposal.
De-dollarisation is on the radar
For most of 2025, no treasury conversation was complete without it: the dollar is losing its hallowed and privileged status as the world's de-facto currency as political pressure on the Federal Reserve's independence unsettled US institutional credibility.
Numerous data points from SIBs flagged that central banks were diversifying reserves at a much faster pace than in previous decades, pointing to gold purchases as a hedge against dollar dependency. Gold prices surged to record prices as a result.
A Bank of America survey of 206 fund managers running $640 billion found dollar positioning at its lowest level since 2004. For a global treasurer, this was the kind of data that reshaped hedging policy and reserve allocation for the year ahead.
De-dollarisation questioned
By 2026, the headlines had moved on as the dollar firmed and the appointment of Kevin Warsh at the Federal Reserve proved less radical than some had feared. The underlying doubt, that the dollar's role at the center of global finance is somehow eroding, has settled into the background of treasury thinking.
In August 2026, Bank of America re-examined the dollar's more recent softness and reached a different conclusion than the debasement story that dominated 2025: the weakness "can almost entirely be attributed to front-end rate differentials."
That's a currency market acting as we would expect and the risk premium in dollar options that signalled genuine debasement fear a year earlier had largely disappeared.
The dollar is staying
According to the BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey, the US dollar appeared on one side of 89% of global FX trades in April 2025, up from 88% three years earlier, measured at the height of the de-dollarisation scare itself.
Institutions are moving more dollars through the system than they were three years earlier.
That leaves ex-US treasuries with a clear takeaway: is their own institution properly equipped to clear, hold, and manage the dollars already moving through it, at the volume the market is actually generating?
The real dollar problem
The dollar is here to stay but solving how it is delivered and moved remains a priority for ex-U.S. treasuries, particularly at a time when dollar correspondent solutions are in retreat outside of the U.S.
"I think the world still moves money in dollars and dollars remain really, really difficult to access in Europe," said George Davis, Lorum CEO and co-founder speaking to FF News at Money 20/20.
He explains the number of banks willing to provide dollar correspondent banking in Europe keeps declining, because the economics of serving smaller and mid-market institutions no longer make sense inside a bank built to lend.
CPMI data, published via the BIS, shows correspondent banking relationships have been in structural decline for over a decade, roughly 30% since 2011. That decline concentrates in the corridors, and the client tiers, that generate the least balance sheet upside for a lending-first bank.
A mid-market European institution offering dollar clearing to its own clients finds fewer correspondent partners every year, because the work was never designed to be profitable for institutions optimising for something else.
Enter the stablecoin
To be sure, the de-dollarisation argument runs deeper than the Fed, U.S. politics and institutional credibility: the dollar clearing system itself has given impetus to a call for dollar alternatives. That case is worth taking seriously, starting with the alternative most often raised in response to it.
Stablecoins are the fix most commonly proposed here, and they deserve serious consideration on their own terms. As George Davis noted in the same conversation, stablecoins function as a hedge for emerging markets, a genuinely different problem from dollar access in the G7 or G20.
The problem facing treasurers moving and holding dollars extends beyond a shrinking correspondent banking pool, with friction living inside the correspondent chain itself: who holds the funds, when they choose to release them, and what their own balance sheet priorities dictate in the meantime.
A parallel settlement rail sits on top of that chain rather than inside it, and a European institution routing dollar payments through a shrinking pool of correspondent banks feels the underlying delay regardless of what settles the message.
What being plugged in properly looks like
European payment sovereignty is a live and legitimate debate in its own right, with new domestic schemes and a stronger push to settle in euros, but it runs alongside this separate, practical reality for any institution still serving clients who trade globally, invoice, and settle in dollars.
The task in front of ex-U.S. treasuries sits apart from currency politics: making sure their institution can clear, hold, and move dollars as efficiently as the volume of dollar business already demands.
The solution to optimizing for a world that will run on dollars for a while yet is a rebuild of the infrastructure that moves dollars on a non-lending model.
Three pillars sit underneath that model:
Clearing gives institutions direct access to local and major payment rails, including USD, through a single API and ledger, bypassing the correspondent chains that introduce delay.
Custody provides named, segregated accounts, so client funds carry clear ownership instead of sitting inside someone else's balance sheet.
Cash management gives institutions consolidated, multi-currency treasury and liquidity infrastructure across the corridors they actually operate in, dollar included.
The model works because dollar clearing sits at the center of the business, ahead of a lending book competing for the same balance sheet. That is the distinction between a bank that happens to offer correspondent services and a specialist correspondent institution built around them.
The infrastructure decision
De-dollarisation was worth taking seriously in 2025, and yet the evidence since has moved firmly against it. The dollar's share of global trade has grown over the exact period the scare was loudest.
For treasuries, the useful response to that evidence is confidence, paired with a concrete next step: making sure their institution is plugged into dollar correspondent banking that is built for the volume of dollars already in motion, and the volume still coming.
Frequently asked questions
Is de-dollarisation actually happening?
The trade data does not support it. According to the BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey, the US dollar appeared on one side of 89% of global FX trades in April 2025, up from 88% three years earlier, measured at the height of the 2025 scare. Bank of America's own August 2026 review attributed that year's dollar weakness to rate differentials, with the risk premium that would signal genuine debasement largely absent.
Why did the dollar weaken through 2025?
Political pressure on the Federal Reserve's independence unsettled investor confidence, and positioning followed. Central banks diversified reserves at pace, and a Bank of America survey of 206 fund managers found dollar positioning at its lowest level since 2004. That reaction reflected sentiment and rate expectations rather than a structural shift away from the currency.
What is dollar correspondent banking, and why is it shrinking?
Dollar correspondent banking is the network of bank relationships institutions rely on to clear and settle USD payments outside the United States. CPMI data, published via the BIS, shows correspondent banking relationships have declined roughly 30% since 2011, concentrated in the corridors and client tiers that generate the least balance sheet upside for banks built to lend rather than to clear. Demand for the dollar itself has little to do with the decline.
Can stablecoins fix dollar access in Europe?
Stablecoins solve a different problem: providing dollar access where correspondent banking is largely absent, mainly in emerging markets. The constraint in a market like Europe sits inside the correspondent chain, in who holds funds and when they release them, a delay that a parallel settlement rail does not reach.
What should ex-US treasuries actually do about this?
Focus on dollar clearing infrastructure rather than on hedging against a decline the evidence does not support. That means securing access to correspondent institutions built specifically for clearing, custody, and cash management, sized for the volume of dollars already moving through the system.
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